AbstractThis paper describes airborne sensor networks for target detection and identification in military applications. One challenge is how to process and aggregate data from many sensor sources to generate an accurate and timely picture of the battlefield. The majority of research in data fusion has focused primarily on level 1 fusion, e.g., using multisensor data to determine the position, velocity, attributes, and identity of individual targets. In this paper we present a novel approach to military force aggregation and classffication using the mathematical theory of evidence and doctrinal templates. Our approach helps commanders understand operational pictures of the battlefield, e.g., enemy force levels and deployment, and make better decisions than adversaries in the battlefield. A simple application of our approach is illustrated in the simulated testbed OTBSAF and RETSINA system.
I. INTRODUCTION Sensor networks are emerging as a new trend in information
technology for monitoring and collecting information in both military and non-military applications. This paper describes airborne sensor networks for target detection and identification in military applications. In a military context, various airborne sensors, e.g., SAR (Synthetic Aperture Radar), EO (ElectroOptical radar), and GMTI (Ground Moving Target Indicator), are mounted on a number of platforms. These platforms such as an F-16 or UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) are deployed in the battlefield for target detection, tracking, and classification. For example, a SAR or EO sensor can recognize the location and identity of a stationary target; a GMTI sensor can detect a moving target and track the movement of the target.
Over the past two decades, a large number of approaches to multisensor data fusion have been developed [1] . The majority of research in data fusion has focused primarily on sensor data alignment, association, and correlation in level 1 fusion, e.g., using multisensor data to determine the position, velocity, attributes, and identity of individual targets. For example, the identity declaration from each sensor usually provides multiple identity declaration and each of them is associated with a confidence factor. Given the identity declarations of individual targets from airborne sensors, data fusion techniques seek to process identity declarations from multiple sensors to achieve a joint declaration of identity [2] .
One challenge in airborne sensor networks is how to process and aggregate data from many sources to generate an accurate and timely picture of the battlefield. Current attempts to bring more information of individual targets to commanders are doomed to failure due to cognitive overload. With enormous amounts of information available for command decisions, it is impossible for commanders to fully analyze raw information for corresponding situation assessment. A mechanism is required to allow commanders to easily model and assess the dynamic situations such as the behavior and intentions of enemy forces based on the flow and fusion of collected information from various sensors [3] . The understanding of the battlefield situation, including location, movement, and deployment of enemy forces, is essential for commanders to make better decisions than adversaries in the battlefield.
In this paper we present a novel approach to force aggregation and classification using the mathematical theory of evidence and doctrinal templates. A doctrinal template depicts the composition and deployment of various types of echelons. We assume the raw sensor data have been transformed into a consistent set of entities before multisensor identity fusion [2] , [4] , [5] . In particular, we will focus on the following three problems,
. Figure 1 describes the process of force aggregation and classification, including (1) multisensor identity fusion; (2) force aggregation (clustering); (3) force classification (template matching). Typically, the process of force aggregation is hierarchical. For example, a cluster of platoons can be clustered into a company that is further included at a battalion or a higher level force.
Commonly used algorithms for multisensor information fusion are Bayesian inference method and Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence. Dempster-Shafer theory produces identical results as Bayesian inference method for multisensor identity fusion when the hypotheses about individual target's identity declarations are singletons and mutually exclusive [6] , [7] , [8] The sensor output for each target is a list of candidate target types (e.g., Ml tank, T80 Tank, etc.) with different confidence levels. Our previous work considers the problem of force aggregation and classification based upon the sensor reports from two dissimilar sensors [9] . In this paper we extend the previous approach to the case of multiple sensors. We first describe how to combine the uncertain information from multiple sensor sources in the framework of Dempster-Shafer's theory, and then we present our approach to force aggregation and classification using Dempster-Shafer theory and doctrinal templates.
A. Dempster-Shafer theory
We now introduce the key concepts of the Dempster-Shafer theory. Let In this paper we consider a common frame of discernment for all SAR sensor outputs. The set of vehicle types V is {T80, T72M, Mi, MlAl, M1A2, 2S6, ZSU23, M977, M35, AVENGER, HMMWV, SA9}. In our scenario, the basic probability assignment can be defined as follows: (1) i,j,A nB.=A ml(Ai)m2(Bj) (1) 1 -Ei,jij, mi(Ai)in2(bj) for all non-empty A C E0 is a basic probability assignment [10] . Bel, the belief function given by m, is called the orthogonal sum of Bell and Bel2. It is written Bel = Bel1 E Bel2.
Note that Dempster's rule of combination is associative and commutative. This means that the processes of combining evidence from multiple sensors are independent of the order in which the sensor outputs are combined.
For any vi E V, m({vi}) can be simplified as For a given target v on the ground, one interesting question is if we can get a higher confidence level for target v after we fuse the two or more sensor reports from the same sensor or from sensors with similar resolutions. Figure 4 shows the fused confidence level for a T80 tank when we fuse multiple sensor reports from the same sensor. The figure tells us that sometimes the confidence level for a T80 tank could be very low from one single sensor report, e.g., m({T80}) = 0.05. We need to fuse multiple sensor reports to improve the accuracies of target classification. Also, the fused confidence level for the T80 tank does not increase monotonically due to the noisy sensor data.
Similarly, we can compute m(E)) as (2) m(6-) -
Given a T80 tank on the ground, Figure 2 describes a list of candidate target types with different confidence levels from a low resolution sensor S1 and a high resolution sensor SAR2. Figure 2 also gives the fused confidence levels for each candidate target type using Dempster's rule of combination. Sometimes, the information about targets from these airbome sensors is noisy. For example, a sensor may confuse a T80 tank with an MIAl tank and give a low confidence level for T80 and give a high confidence level for MIAl. Figure 3 illustrates two lists of candidate target types for a T80 tank using the same SAR sensor. The SAR sensor confuses the T80 tank with an MIAl tank in list (b), where M2({T80}) < M2({M1A1}). The clustering of vehicles is based on the relative distance between any two vehicles (or clusters) and the number of vehicles in the template. For example, we know from the doctrinal templates that a platoon usually has 4 to 9 vehicles and these vehicles are deployed in a lOOm x lOOm area. We will get clusters of tank platoons if we define the termination conditions as (1) the maximal D(Si, S) as lOOm and (2) maximal number of vehicles in a cluster as 9. Sometimes the condition cannot guarantee we can identify clusters of vehicles at the low-level force, but we still can cluster them at highlevel. For example, if a company of T80 tank stays very close, we probably cannot recognize three T80 platoons but we can recognize them as a T80 company.
C. Doctrinal Template Matching
In this section we discuss how to recognize the type of an echelon using doctrinal templates. A Figure 5 , each vehicle ui in the cluster CL is associated with a list of candidate target types and basic probability assignment mi for each target type and 0. We can get the corresponding basic probability assignment m for Ti E {T1,T2,...,Tl} m({T})= Z (max (Cl, C2, )C) -CJ) (6) The following figure illustrates the combined belief functions for three tank platoons with one, two, or three tanks. The figure tells us the confidence level is low if the sensors only find some of the total vehicles in templates. In practice, a T80 tank platoon with low confidence could be misclassified as an MI tank platoon at platoon level. However, the cluster of tanks can still be recognized as part of a T80 tank company at company level using our approach. In other words, our approach is robust against the incomplete and ambiguous information from sensors and reduces effect of the ambiguity caused by missing targets on the higher level force classification. In this section, we first introduce a modeling and simulation environment, OTBSAF (OneSAF Testbed Baseline) 1 and its integration with the RETSINA system (Reusable Environment for Task Structured Intelligent Network Agents) [12] . And then we discuss some experimental results of force aggregation and classification in the simulated testbed.
A. OTBSAF and RETSINA System OTBSAF models common military vehicles, aircraft, and sensors, and simulates uncertainty for entities' individual and doctrinal behaviors in the battlefield. We extend OTBSAF and integrate it with our RETSINA multiagent system. One of our contributions to OTBSAF is to add three simulated mounted sensors, SARSim, EOSim, and GMTISim, to the simulation environment.
The SARSim simulates an automatic target recognition (ATR) system that receives its input from a synthetic aperture radar (SAR) that is operating in spotlight-mode. In spotlightmode, a SAR scans an area of terrain, and the ATR will attempt to recognize any stationary object within the bounds of that scanned area. The output from the SARSim is a list of candidate target types (e.g., Ml tank, T80 Tank, etc.) with different confidence levels. While a real SAR/ATR system will report confidence levels for around three dozen entities, SARSim will report for a dozen entities. The GMTISim simulates a ground moving target indicator (GMTI) radar, which focuses a radar beam on one spot, and if it detects a moving target there with its ATR system, a motion tracker mechanism follows the movement of the target. While very similar in output and behavior to the SARSim, it is complementary, because it only recognizes entities that are moving, while the SARSim only recognizes entities that are stationary. The EOSim simulates an electro-optical sensor that detects targets at distances and in conditions in which they would be detectable in the ultraviolet, visible, and infrared light spectra.
B. Experimental Results
Let's consider the following scenario: an F-16 first locates targets in the battlefield using low resolution sensors, and then a UAV revisits some areas with groups of targets using high resolution sensors.
We consider a simple application of our approach for SARSims on the simulated testbed OTBSAF and RETSINA system, where there are three T80 tank platoons, P1, P2, and P3, on the ground, and each platoon consists of three T80 tanks. An F-16 is tasked to scan the area first using a low resolution SARSim and then a UAV is tasked to scan the same area using a high resolution SARSim. Figure 7 and Figure 8 show a list of possible target identities with different confidence levels for each T80 tank on the ground. Note that the highest confidence identification in a series of lowconfidence is not necessarily the correct classification, e.g., target 1020, 1027, 1037, and 1044 in Figure 7 . Also, tank Given SARSim outputs for a tank ui, we first convert the outputs to belief functions and then combine the belief functions using Dempster's rule of combination. Next we discuss how to recognize the type of a given echelon solely based on the outputs of low resolution SARSim SAR1, or based on the fused outputs of two SARsims SAR1 and SAR2 through Dempster-Shafer's theory. We assume tanks or vehicles have been clustered into platoons according to the distances between them. 1) Platoon Level Classification: In the platoon level, we choose 7 platoon templates from OTBSAF: US Ml platoon, US MIAl platoon, US M1A2 platoon, USSR T72M platoon, USSR T80 platoon, USSR SA9 platoon, and USSR 2S6 platoon. and SAR2. The basic probability assignments for the T80 company are shown in Table VI   TABLE III  BASIC PROBABILITY ASSIGNMENTS FOR CLUSTERS OF TANKS, P1, The basic probability assignments for each cluster of tanks, P1 and P2, as a T80 tank platoon can be computed according to Definition 3 and results are shown as in Table III , where frame of discernment for P1 and P2 is {T80tplatoon, -'T80-platoon}. Similarly, the basic probability assignments for P3 are shown in the same table.
2) Company Level Classification: In this section we discuss the problem of recognizing the type of echelons in company level from platoons. We choose six templates in the company level: US Ml company, US MlAl company, US M1A2 company, USSR T72M company, USSR T80 company, USSR 2S6 battery (see Table IV IV. RELATED WORK The idea of using Dempster-Shafer theory for multisensor data fusion is not new. For example, Lowrance at al. apply Dempster-Shafer theory in reasoning about the locations and activities of multiple ships from intelligence reports [13] ; Bogler studies whether the targets belong to the set of friendly or the set of not friendly aircraft in multisensor target identification systems using Dempster-Shafer theory [14] . Recently, Schubert extends those approaches to force clustering and classification [15] , [16] , where elements, e.g., intelligence reports, vehicles, and echelons, are clustered into subsets. Schubert uses the conflict of Dempster's rule as an indication of whether the elements belong together and focuses on how to handle intelligence reports with multiple nonspecific and uncertain hypotheses. Our work is related to Schubert's approach, but we do not consider sensor reports clustering for each target. Also, our approach is computationally efficient since we only consider pairwise conflicts between vehicles (or subechelon) in a cluster and elements in templates.
Bayesian inference techniques have been utilized for force aggregation [17] . Given the prior knowledge of each target and sensor in the battlefield, a Bayesian classifier has been developed for matching the observed echelon with different templates. For example, Bakert and Losiewicz partition the force into a mutually and exclusive set of units [18] . The units of the partition are used to create a set of unit templates in the hierarchy network of military force. In their approach, the posterior probability for each node is computing using Bayesian methods and is propagated through the hierarchy network as positive or negative evidence for the inclusion of each unit in the partition. In order to get better performance, the accumulated evidence in the network is learned through a set of randomly selected potential solutions using genetic algorithm. In this paper we use a bottom-up approach, instead of the top-down approach as described in [18] , for force aggregation and classification. It would be interesting to study the possibility of combining these two approaches in force aggregation and classification.
Looney refined the fusion architecture for building a more accurate picture [19] , [20] . Looney gave an alternative methods of fusing multisensor multitarget tracking data using a fuzzy clustering algorithm -C-means fuzzy clustering. Different from agglomerative clustering algorithm, fuzzy clustering assigns different degrees of membership to each entity. Thus, it allows each entity to belong to multiple clusters with various fuzzy membership values. Looney's approach makes the clustering independent of the ordering (k-means algorithm relies on the order), but the number K for a fuzzy Kcluster needs to be empirically estimated, where K is usually unknown in the battlefield with asymmetric information. More recently, Looney and Liang developed a simple clustering algorithm for force aggregation, where each target is denoted as a feature vector [21] . The clustering algorithm is similar to ours, but they only consider the case of each target having a belief value between 0 and 1 for a single target type. In this paper, we describe a framework of multisensor data fusion for force aggregation, where the decision of a sensor is a list of candidate target types with different confidence levels.
V. CONCLUSION
An understanding of force level and deployment is essential for battlefield situation assessment and threat assessment. In this paper we present a novel approach to force aggregation and classification using Dempster-Shafer theory and doctrinal templates. In the future work we plan to evaluate the effectiveness of our approach at platoon and company level forces. We also plan to use the context of terrain and redundant sensor data to identify and reduce false positive targets in sensor reports [22] .
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